It is straight-forward to check that the argument of F is strictly increasing in p Ch 2 (s Ch 2 ) since L < M < R. Moreover, if p Ch 2 (s Ch 2 ) = 0 then W (0) = F Proof of Claim 2. Suppose that p Ch 1 ∈ (0, 1) and voters conjecture that, depending on her type, the challenger exerts effortsê L 2 andê M 2 in the general election stage. Then, expected payoffs of liberal and moderate challengers who exert efforts e L 2 and e M 2 , respectively, denoted by EΠ t Ch =L (e L 2 ) and EΠ t Ch =M (e M 2 ), can be written as where p Ch 2 (µ) and p Ch 2 (λ) are specified in equations (1a) and (1b).
Assume that voters' beliefs after observing liberal and moderate signals during the general election campaign are the same, that is, p Ch 2 (µ) = p Ch 2 (λ) and W (p Ch 2 (µ)) − W (p Ch 2 (λ)) = 0. In this case, both types of challengers would choose zero effort, which means that signals are perfectly informative and we must have p Ch 2 (µ) = 1 and p Ch 2 (λ) = 0. Thus, p Ch 2 (µ) = p Ch 2 (λ). Assume next that p Ch 2 (µ) < p Ch 2 (λ) then using Claim 1 we obtain W (p Ch 2 (µ)) − W (p Ch 2 (λ)) < 0. In this case, liberal challenger will exert zero effort, in which case moderate signal would fully reveal a moderate challenger p Ch 2 (µ) = 1. In that case, we obtain W (p Ch 2 (µ)) − W (p Ch 2 (λ)) > 0, which contradicts our assumption above.
Thus, the only beliefs (ê L 2 ,ê M 2 ) that might be consistent with equilibrium are Given these beliefs, the moderate challenger would choose to exert no effort, e M 2 = 0, and liberal signal becomes perfectly informative of a liberal type, p Ch 2 (λ) = 0. For any pair of beliefs (p Ch 1 ,ê L 2 ) define the best-response function of liberal challenger e L 2 (ê L 2 , p Ch 1 ) as the one that maximizes her expected payoff This best-response function is decreasing inê L 2 and satisfies 0 < e L 2 (1, p Ch 1 ) < e L 2 (0, p Ch 1 ) < 1. Therefore, there exists a unique fixed point e L * 2 such that e L 2 (ê L 2 , p Ch 1 ) =ê L 2 ≡ e L * 2 . This optimal effort for the liberal challenger is determined by equation (3b) specified in Theorem 1, QED.
Proof of Claim 3. We will use the Implicit Function theorem to prove this claim. Define
.
Proof of Claim 4. Recall that Eu(z j , p k 1 (s k 1 )) denotes expected utility of voter who has ideal point z j when the winner of the primary stage is candidate k who generated signal s k 1 and, thus, believed to be moderate with probability p k 1 (s k 1 ):
On the other hand, a moderate politician who was revealed to be moderate in the primary stage and advances to the general election stage brings voter with ideal point z j expected utility of Eu(z j , 1) where
The voter with ideal point z j will vote in the primary for a candidate k with belief p k 1 (s k 1 ) ∈ (0, 1) over candidate l with p l 1 (s l 1 ) = 1 if and only if Eu(z j , p k 1 (s k 1 )) ≥ Eu(z j , 1). Define function S(z j ) which captures the utility difference for a voter z j between supporting an uncertain type p k 1 (s k 1 ) ∈ (0, 1) and a moderate type p l 1 (s l 1 ) = 1. This function can be re-written as
First, we consider under which conditions S(z j ) ≥ 0 for z j ∈ [0,d]. S(z j ) ≥ 0 can be written as
If right-hand side of the inequality ( * ) is negative, then we only need to make sure that the left-hand side is positive. If, however, the right-hand side is positive, then
Collecting all the terms, we obtain that the right-hand side of inequality ( * ) is bounded above by
, which is exactly the left-hand side of inequality ( * ). Thus, inequality ( * ) is satisfied as long as function W (p Ch 2 (µ)) is (weakly) concave and the left-hand side of the inequality is non-negative, which simply means that voter z j prefers to nominate a liberal over a moderate type because the gains from nominating a politician who is ideologically closer to him outweighs the risk (expressed in the utility terms) from this candidate losing the election:
1 To see this notice that for all zj ∈ [0,d] we have assumed that u(zj, L) > u(zj, M ) > u(zj, R), which ensures
, which is guaranteed for all p Ch 2 (µ) ∈ (0, 1) since
≤ 0 and it is enough to make sure that S(d) ≥ 0 to guarantee that all voters with z j ∈ [0,d] vote for the uncertain over moderate type in the primary election. If, however, M < γL
dz j > 0 and it is enough to make sure that S(0) ≥ 0 to guarantee that all voters with z j ∈ [0,d] vote for the uncertain over moderate type in the primary election, QED.
Proof of Claim 5. Assume that voters believe thatê M 1 ∈ (0, 1],ê L 1 = 0 and candidate A follows this strategy. We will show that candidate B wants to follows this strategy as well. First consider what liberal candidate B would do:
The first inequality follows from the fact that W (p 2 (µ)) − e L * 2 (p 1 (λ)) ≥ 0 since liberal challenger could choose zero effort in the general election stage and preferred not to. The second inequality follows from the condition 2W (0) > W (1). Therefore, liberal candidate B prefers to put no effort in the primary campaign.
Consider now incentives of moderate candidate B:
Define best-response function of moderate candidate B, e M * 1 (ê M 1 ). This is the effort level of moderate candidate B, e M * 1 ∈ (0, 1), that solves
Notice that best-response exists and it is unique for allê M 1 ∈ (0, 1].
We are left to show that there exists a unique fixed point such that e M * 1 (ê M 1 ) =ê M 1 , which is determined by the equation (3a). This follows from three observations: (1) e M * 1 (0) > 0, (2) e M * 1 (1) < 1, and (3)
< 0 by the Implicit Function theorem and assumptions imposed on the scrutiny function h. We, therefore, conclude that there exists a unique fixed point e M * 1 (ê M 1 ) =ê M 1 that constitutes part of the equilibrium strategy, QED.
Proofs of Claims 6 and 8.
As Theorem 1 asserts, the optimal efforts of candidates (e M * 1 , e L * 2 ) are determined by equations (3a) and (3b), and depend upon n 1 and n 2 , which are exogenous parameters that capture prominence levels of the primary and the general election stages, respectively. To simplify exposition, we abuse notation and use the following shortcuts
Then equations (3a) and (3b) can be re-written as 
If scrutiny function satisfies condition (C3), which asserts that −g xx · g ≥ g 2 x for all x ∈ [0, 1], then the sign of ∂V ∂x is negative. To see why this is the case, notice that
First inequality follows from concavity of function W . Further, 2W (0) > W (1) guarantees that
Once, the sign of ∂V ∂x is determined, so is the signs of the denominators
Thus, both liberal challengers in the general election and moderate candidates in the primaries exert less effort when primaries are more visible:
In addition, we obtain d
by substituting ∂x ∂n 1 and ∂y ∂n 1 into the derivative above and performing algebraic manipulations given the assumptions imposed on scrutiny and winning general election functions. Thus, voters believe that the likelihood that moderate type generates signal λ in the primary and signal µ in the general election is lower when the primary race is more prominent. This completes the proof of Claim 6.
Further, higher prominence level of the general election incentivizes moderate candidates in the primary to exert higher effort and results in more likely revelations of the liberal challengers in the general election stage: Proof of Claim 7. We will prove that the likelihood of the candidate from the Democratic party winning the election is decreasing in the prominence level of the primary selection process. We will continue using the notation introduced in Proofs of Claims 6 and 8 to save trees:
First, note that W (·) is weakly concave, and, therefore, W (x) ≤ W (x)−W (0) x ∀x ∈ (0, 1). < 0, which guarantees that the whole derivative is negative.
Assume that
and we will re-write the whole derivative as
We will show now that the last bracket is positive:
This last inequality can be re-written as W (x)·(a+b) ≥ W (0)·a+W (1)·b where a = 3h+g−2hg, b = 2g − 2g 2 and x = g h+g . Notice that
Thus, since function W (·) is strictly increasing and weakly concave we get
Appendix B: Properties of Scrutiny Function
In this section we discuss the role of the assumption (A1c) which states that a candidate that exerts no effort generates signal which coincides with her type for sure, that is, h(0, t, n) = 0. This assumption plays an important part in Claim 3. In particular, when h(0, t, n) = 0, we show in Claim 3, that the liberal challenger exerts more effort in pretending to be moderate during the general election campaign when prior on her being moderate at the beginning of the general election campaign is higher,
Consider the basic election model in which candidate that exerts no effort has a very small but positive chance of generating signal opposite from her true type. To capture this, we will modify assumption (A1c):
In the remainder of this section, we characterize optimal behavior of challenger in the general election stage depending on her type (Claim 2*) and then study how it varies with prior belief about challenger's type, p Ch 1 (Claim 3*).
Claim 2*. Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions (A1a), (A1b), (A1c * ), (A1d)- (A1f), (A2)- (A6). If the belief about challenger's type at the beginning of the general election stage is degenerate, p Ch 1 = 0 or p Ch 1 = 1, then she exerts no effort irrespectively of her type. If, however, voters are uncertain about challenger's type after the primary race, i.e. p Ch 1 ∈ (0, 1), then the unique equilibrium in the general election subgame prescribes the moderate challenger to exert no effort and the liberal challenger to put positive effort in mimicking the moderate type, where the amount of mimicking e L * 2 is determined by equation (*) below
Proof of Claim 2*. First note that Claim 1 and its proof remain unchanged with modified assumption (A1c*), as they do not depend on the properties of the scrutiny function h.
Suppose that p Ch 1 ∈ (0, 1) and voters conjecture that, depending on her type, the challenger exerts effortsê L 2 andê M 2 in the general election stage. Then, expected payoffs of liberal and moderate challengers who exert efforts e L 2 and e M 2 , respectively, denoted by EΠ t Ch =L (e L 2 ) and EΠ t Ch =M (e M 2 ), can be written as
Assume that voters' beliefs after observing liberal and moderate signals during the general election campaign are the same, that is, p Ch 2 (µ) = p Ch 2 (λ) and W (p Ch 2 (µ)) − W (p Ch 2 (λ)) = 0. In this case, both types of challengers would choose zero effort since
which is satisfied only for = 1 2 . In other words, as long as
is not part of the equilibrium system of beliefs.
Assume next that p Ch 2 (µ) < p Ch 2 (λ) then using Claim 1 we obtain W (p Ch 2 (µ)) − W (p Ch 2 (λ)) < 0. In this case, liberal challenger will exert zero effort since
and we must have
The inequality above is false as long as
Thus, the only beliefs (ê L 2 ,ê M 2 ) that might be consistent with equilibrium are
Given these beliefs, the moderate challenger would choose to exert no effort, since
as the one that maximizes her expected payoff
We will show that this best-response function is decreasing inê L 2 . Define function S ē L 2 ,ê L 2 = 0 and use Implicit Function Theorem to obtain the required derivative. For the simplicity of exposition, we will use the following shortcuts in this part:
Therefore, there exists a unique fixed point
. This optimal effort for the liberal challenger is determined by equation (1) specified above, QED.
Claim 3*. Assume that the parameters of the election game satisfy assumptions (A1a), (A1b), (A1c * ), (A1d)-(A1f), (A2)-(A6) and p Ch 1 ∈ [0, 1). Then for all δ < 1, there exists * > 0 such that ∀ < * we have
Proof of Claim 3*. We will use the Implicit Function theorem to prove this claim. Use the following shortcuts to simplify the exposition:
where p 2 (µ) and p 2 (λ) are described in equation (*) above.
where dp2(µ) dp1
Under what conditions
Recall that the winning function W (p 2 ) is strictly increasing in p 2 (Claim 1). Thus, W (p 2 ) > 0 for all p 2 ∈ [0, 1]. In particular,
Now, consider the following inequality
The left-hand side of this inequality is a positive constant, while the right-hand side approaches zero from above when approaches zero. Therefore, for any (p 1 , e L * 2 ) there exists * p 1 , e L * 2 > 0 such that for all < * p 1 , e L * 2 the inequality above is satisfied. This means that for all
we have
Example. To intuit Claim 3* and appreciate the role of assumption (A1c*) consider the basic election game with the scrutiny function h(e, t, n) = + (1 − n) · √ e probability winning function W p First note that these functions satisfy assumptions (A1a), (A1b), (A1d)- (A1f) and ( As Figure 1 illustrates, for any positive value of , the peak of the function is interior. However, as approaches zero, the peak shifts to the right, that is p Ch 1 that maximizes e L * 2 (p Ch 1 ) approaches 1. When = 0, the optimal effort of liberal challenger is strictly increasing in p Ch 1 on the domain (0, 1) but drops discontinuously at p Ch 1 = 1 to zero.
Appendix C: Election Game with Partially Informative Primaries
Proof of Theorem 2.
Behavior of the challenger in the general election stage.
Similar to the basic election model, the challenger's chances of winning general election are determined by the preferences of the general-election median voter. Since all registered Democrats vote for the challenger irrespectively of his type, the median voter in the general election stage has an ideal point z j ∈ (z, 1) and, consequently, believes that any Democratic nominee is equally likely to be a liberal or a moderate type. The argument presented in Claim 2 and its proof holds here as well. That is, the unique equilibrium in the general election stage is for moderate challenger to exert no effort,ẽ M * 2 = 0, and for liberal challenger to exert effort levelẽ L * 2 ∈ (0, 1) which is determined by the equation
Behavior of registered Democrats in the primary election.
At the end of the primary campaign, registered Democrats contemplate candidate l who is moderate for sure, p l = 1, and candidate k whose type is uncertain and who is believed to be moderate with probability p k 1 ∈ (0, 1):
The last inequality holds true for the majority of the registered Democrats, because it is implied by Eu(z j , 0) ≥ Eu(z j , 1) which is guaranteed by conditions (C1) and (C2).
Behavior of candidates in the primary stage.
Assume that voters believe thatê M 1 ∈ (0, 1],ê L 1 = 0 and candidate A follows this strategy. We will show that candidate B wants to follows this strategy as well. First consider what liberal candidate B would do:
Notice that the expected payoff of the liberal challenger (last brackets) does not depend on behavior in the primary stage. Therefore,
2 , L, n 2 )) · W (0) < 0 chance of winning the election in the game with partially informative primaries compared with the basic game, we use properties of the winning function W (·) as well as Claim 9 which ranks effort levels of candidates in these two versions of the game. In particular, the proof follows from algebraic manipulations using the following observations: 
Appendix D: Election Game with Endogenous Primary Prominence
Proof of Theorem 3. The election game with endogenous primary prominence (as defined in Section 5.2) is the same as the basic election model studied in Sections 2 -4 except for the investment decisions of primary candidates. Therefore, to prove Theorem 3, it suffices to show that expected payoff of a moderate candidate is decreasing and expected payoff of a liberal candidate is increasing in the primary prominence. This would guarantee that liberal candidates are happy to invest in boosting primary visibility, while moderate ones refrain from doing so.
Ex-ante expected payoff of candidate k who has type t k = L can be written as To show that this derivative is positive,
> 0, we use equilibrium condition (3b), the fact that if liberal challenger chose to exert positive effort in the general election stage this means he prefers this action to exerting no effort at all 
